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THE UNION BANK OF TALLAHASSEE
An Experiment in Territorial Finance
By KATHRYN T. ABBEY
Florida State College for Women

In view of the recent financial confusion in the
United States, similar difficulties of the Florida of
a century ago assume more than a passing interest.
The problem of self development has always been
pressing for Florida; since the days of the purchase
from Spain exaggerated claims of economic opportunity have lured the investor sometimes to sound
wealth and sometimes, alas, to the reverse. The first
Florida boom was launched in 1821 when the United
States government set itself the task of raising the
five million dollar purchase price from the sale of
1
the lands just acquired . These internal improvement projects became involved in the frenzied
finance of the eighteen thirties and forties, thus giving rise to a variety of investment devices resembling the last few years in the giddiness of their concepts and the calamitous quality-of their failures.
Part and parcel of this movement was the Union
Bank of Tallahassee whose possibilities of profit to
the investor and benefit to the Territory seemed
limitless until it struck the grim rock of reality of its
decade. There was little banking as such in Florida
prior to its becoming territory of the United States.
Trading houses met what needs of credit and exchange existed. Panton, Leslie and Company established such services during the English control and
2
continued them after the Spanish reoccupation .
Hardly had the territory been organized before bank
projects sprang up with mushroom-like rapidity;
each plan constituting a special case as there were
1 Message, December 7, 1824. In Richardson, Messages
and Papers of the Presidents, II, p. 253.
2 Rerick, Memoirs of Florida, II, p. 42. The Company was virtually
banker for the Spanish colonial administration.
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no general banking laws. The territorial Governor
DuVal frustrated these measures until 1828 when
the Bank of Florida was chartered over his veto. As
none of these early corporations were successful, it
is not necessary to consider them in detail.
The banking needs of the territory were keenly
felt, however, and efforts to establish. going concerns continued. In the early thirties, the Big
Three came into existence: they were the Bank of
Pensacola, the Southern Life Insurance and Trust
Company, and the Union Bank of Tallahassee. Of
the three, the last was the most fateful. The pattern
for the organization of the Union Bank was the recently chartered Bank of Louisiana located at New
Orleans; its specific planning was the work of John
G. Gamble, a Virginian, who had come to the Territory about 1827. This bank had the doubtful honor
of being the first institution of its kind supported by
the governor. In fact, in his message to the Legislative Council of 1833, DuVal urged the establishment of a “planter bank” on the ground that the
commercial institutions did not meet the demands of
agricultural economy. “If an institution could be
established on suitable terms and under such ample
security as to induce the investment of foreign capital in it, this permanent objection would not exist.
But to meet my approval it must be in fact as well
as in name the planters’bank. I recommend this
subject to the consideration of the Legislative
3
Council” .
Within a month the charter of the Union Bank
had passed by a vote of eleven to seven. As the
charter contained a clause conditioning the operation of the bank on the express approval of Congress,
the Governor returned it to the Council on the
3 of DuVal.

Legislative journal 1833.

https://stars.library.ucf.edu/fhq/vol15/iss4/3

2

Abbey: The Union Bank of Tallahassee: An Experiment in Territorial Finan

209
ground that this provision would postpone if not defeat the desirable ends to be realized from the bill.
The Council was amenable to the argument for it
omitted the offending clause by a majority of two,
4
and the bill was approved .
The Union Bank thus authorized was opened with
a capital of $1,000,000 to be subscribed only by landowning citizens who might secure their stock by a
twenty year mortgage on land, slaves, houses etc.
The value of this security was estimated by a
Board appointed by the Governor. Two-thirds of
the value of the stock could be returned to the stockholders in the form of loans. The actual working
capital consisted of one thousand bonds of $1000
each issued by the Territory and sold by the bank at
par. After operating for a year, the bank had the
privilege of raising its capital to $3,000,000 by the
same process. The charter lasted for forty years,
the stockholders mortgages were due in twenty
years and the bonds payable in twenty-four to thirty
years; thus if the arithmetic of the enterprise was
carried out according to plan, the schedule of payment could be met. For this generous use of its
credit, the Territory received the right to appoint
five of the twelve directors and, after the bonds
had been redeemed, one half the profits for educational purposes.
The Union Bank was not the sole institution to
use territorial credit as capital. To the Bank of
Pensacola were issued $500,000 in bonds and to the
Southern Life Insurance and Trust Company (primarily of St. Augustine) $400,000. This brought
4

of February 13, 1833. The charter is nearly the same as
that of the Bank of Louisiana which gave $5,000,000 of faith
bonds. Details of t h e passage of the charter were related
several years later
to the People,” Florida Herald,
St. Augustine, April 24, 1843.
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the total number of territorial bonds or “faith
5
bonds,” as they came to be called, to $3,900,000 .
The question of the validity of this new method of
financing was raised at once; indeed, it was sup6
posed-to be the reason why the stock sold so slowly .
To overcome this reluctance, opinions were sought
from eminent legal authorities on the following questions: 1)did the Territory have the authority to
issue the bonds, 2)could they be annulled by Congress, and 3)could the Territory on becoming a state
release itself from its obligations. Replies are recorded from Chancellor Kent, Peter Jay, Horace
Binney and Daniel Webster. Whether others were
asked who did not answer or whether there were adverse replies, there is no way of telling. The four
cited, whose names were something with which to
conjure in legal circles, disagreed on various points
but were united in the essentials, namely that the
Territory had the right to issue the bonds and that
the bonds themselves once issued could not be de7
nied . Congress itself gave an apparent sanction to
the practice by taking no contrary action. The charter, together with other territorial legislation, must
have come up for consideration by December 1833
but no adverse report was made. Two years later,
the Senate Committee on Finance conducted an extended examination of the three institutions using
territorial credit. This action was occasioned by a
resolution passed in May 1836 ordering the inquiry,
and raising the query of the desirability of legisla5 of the Banking Committee, Executive Documents, House of
Representatives, 26th Congress, 2nd session, IV, no 111, p. 249.
This source will be cited hereafter as Ex. Docs. of R no 111.
6 David Yancey, History of Banking in Florida, p. 31.
(Unpublished manuscript. There are copies in the University
of Florida Library, and the library of Julien C. Yonge, Pensacola.)
7 Ex. Docs, H of R. no 111, Report of the Committee on the
Judiciary, pp. 269ff.
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tive action. The Committee sustained the power of
the Legislative Council in granting the charters but
criticised their provisions as “highly objectionable
and such as no charter ought to have embraced.”
Inasmuch as the banks were already in operation,
the Committee advised that the Council rather than
Congress was the fitting agent for their readjustment. Accordingly it suggested a joint resolution
declaring that the Territory amend the status of the
8
faith bonds . This measure passed the Senate but
was allowed to die in the House in spite of the fact
that there had been a similar discussion in that
9
body . The same year Congress prevented subsequent incorporation of banks by territorial legislatures without its approval. Thus whatever weakness future events might reveal, the supporters of
the faith bonds had every reason to believe in the
lasting legality of the territorial pledge.
The charter of the bank had stipulated that books
should be opened at specified places reaching from
Pensacola to Key West in order that the distribution of stock might be general throughout Florida.
In spite of this, no books were opened east of Tallahassee and at no more than three places altogether
-Tallahassee, Marianna, and Pensacola. Although
sixty days was the limit prescribed for taking up the
stock, the books stayed open from April 10, 1833 to
10
January 22, 1835 .
8 Documents, 24th Congress, 1st session, v. 6, no 409. Report of the Committee on Finance, June 20, 1836. The chairman of this Committee was Webster who was must interested
in preserving American credit abroad, (the territorial bonds
were generally sold abroad), and later was actively engaged
in bolstering up failing values. McGrane, R. C., “Some
Aspects of American State Debts in Forties” in American
Historical Review, July 1933.
9 Gilpin, Henry D., Statement of the Case of the Bonds and Guarantees issued by the Territory of Florida, Philadelphia,
1847, p. 7.
10 Ex. Docs, H of R, no 111, p. 278. Report of the Committee
on Banks.
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The result of this procedure was to make a middle
Florida planter institution of the Union Bank from
the start. All the stock was centered in a few counties; of these Jefferson county controlled a majority
of the subscriptions. Likewise, the stock was concentrated in comparatively small groups. John
Gamble, the sole president the bank ever had owned
594 shares ($100 per share) and Robert Gamble, also
an official, possessed 754 shares. Such a situation
was not surprising when one considers the rising influence of the middle Florida counties. Over half
the taxable land of the territory lay in this section
and a large percentage of the population. In 1840
the population of Florida was listed as 49,650 of
ll
which 10,713 were in Leon county alone . Of the
654 white males over 21 years of age in Leon county,
106 held 13,727 shares in the Union Bank.
On the basis of the stock subscription, Governor
DuVal issued 360 territorial bonds of $1000 each on
April 16, 1834. These were sold in New York and
Philadelphia a few months later and a contract made
with the bankers to dispose of the rest of the bonds
12
when issued . The sale was accomplished by
February 1835 and a premium of one per cent made
on the exchange drawn against the securities. Meanwhile the new institution opened for business on
January 16, 1835.
In spite of high hopes, the late thirties. was hardly
an auspicious time for financial experimentation.
Events of both Territory and nation conspired to
produce difficulties. The year 1837 witnessed the
panic which was to engulf the whole country in financial loss and readjustment. Previous to the
panic, in Florida there had been the freeze of 1835
11 Roll in House Journal, 1846, App. 9-10.
12 of the Florida bonds were marketed through Prime Ward
& King, J. D. Beers & Company, and J. L. and S. Joseph of
New York, and Thomas Biddle & Company of Philadelphia.
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and then, as if the first two were not enough, the
Seminole campaigns added their quota of destruction and widespread uncertainty. Planters who had
possessed valid security for their stock purchases
saw it swept away by the frost and the tomahawk.
Many left the new country in discouragement and a
very effective check was put to further immigration.
13
In spite of these handicaps the Union Bank prepared to increase its capital stock by another half
million dollars. Such was the enthusiasm of the
would-be investors that within sixty days the amount
had been generously oversubscribed. Whereupon
the directors decided to push the capital to its full
14
amount under the charter, namely, $3,000,000 . For
this act they were to be roundly berated later on by
the Banking Committee of the House of Representatives of the Legislative Council when the latter undertook its investigation of banking transactions:
The idea of a bank founded on borrowed
capital had been ill understood, now it was perfectly comprehensible. To become suddenly
rich, to become offhand the proprietor of land,
negroes, houses and equipages simply by
pledging property on a loan, with twenty years
credit, which property could be bought with
money thus obtained, was to enjoy in reality
the vision of fiction. The charter of the bank
was an El Dorado; it authorized a further issue
of 2,000 bonds. The first 1,000 had been readily, spontaneously, unexpectedly converted into
13 Ex Docs, H of R, no 111, p. 279, Report of the Banking Committee. The condition of the bank in 1837 had been such
that a loan of one-half million dollars had been contracted
payable in three months to two years. $300,000 was paid in
New York and $300,000 in London. This was repaid apparently from the new stock subscriptions. At one time it had
been reported that the bank had actually failed. Apalachicola
Gazette, May 13, 1837.
14 p. 367. Reply of the Directors of the Union Bank.
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money; could there be any doubts respecting the
sale of the latter? Of course not, the possibility
15
does not appear to have been entertained .
Several irregularities occurred in connection with
the new stock subscription. In the first place, the
law stated that the Secretary of the Territory
should affix the seal to the bonds, but the actual
task was performed by Robert Copeland, secretary
to the governor, who was compensated by the Bank.
The point of the criticism was somewhat lost, however, by the fact that both the previous. issues had
been sealed by the Directors, the seal having been
borrowed for the purpose as Westcott, then Secre16
tary, refused to serve without pay . A second irregularity was charged against the sale of the bonds
which, contrary to the charter, were sold in foreign
17
markets below their face value ($1,000) . To this,
the Bank made two counter statements. One was to
the effect that the law meant “par in Tallahassee”
18
where currency had depreciated about 20% , a
thoroughly weak and untenable excuse. The other,
a more substantial position attributed the difference
in price to rates of exchange and advanced the justification that no American security could be sold in a
19
foreign market which did not bend to this situation .
It was during the 1837-38 stock subscription that
the bank first acquired the charge of favoritism and
catering to the interests of a selected few. Of the
20,000 shares put on the market in this transaction,
15 Report of the Bank Committee, p. 283.
16 question of the issue of the 2,000 bonds without the Secretary’s seal was raised by a later Secretary (DuVal) in a letter to Blackburn, Chairman of the Bank Committee, House
Journal, 1842, p. 128. Gamble replied to the charge in a letter
to the Governor (Call) February 21, 1842. Ibid, p. 237.
17 Ex Docs, H of R, no 111. Report of the Bank Committee, p. 281.
Bonds were sold in London as low as 89.50 instead of 100.
1 8
p . 285.
19
p. 381. Reply of the Directors of the Union Bank.
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old stockholders were permitted to absorb over
17,000 shares; the remaining shares were divided
among 152 new subscribers while 164 would-be investors received nothing. In addition each person
holding eight shares was allowed one more without
20
increasing his security . The Banks attempted to
explain both actions; the first on the ground that
according to their interpretation of the charter, it
gave first choice to old shareholders and the second,
by the claim that the increase of territorial land
values necessitated such a practice to avoid des21
criminations against old stockholders .
Before the total amount of stock had been actually
raised the Territory issued the last two thousand
22
bonds and Gamble started North to negotiate their
sale. A small number (200) were sold in New York
but the greater part were marketed in Amsterdam
where one hundred bonds were placed and London
which absorbed nine hundred sixty-six. Thirty
bonds were sold in Florida. The remaining seven
hundred four bonds were left with an agent in London who
was instructed not to sell them below nine23
ty-five . This limitation was subsequently removed
24
but none of the securities sold .
It was not a difficult task to induce European
investors to purchase American stocks and bonds
in the 1830’s and 40’s. European markets had
an abundance of idle money and the rate of interest on American securities was two or three
per cent higher than on those of foreign na2

0

pp. 283-4. Report of the Bank Committee.
pp. 368, 388. Reply of the Directors of the Union Bank.
The Directors declared that the value of land, securities etc.,
had risen one third.
2 2
p . 284. Report of the Bank Committee.
23 of the Bonds and Guarantees, p. 16.
24 Ex Docs, H of R, no 111, p. 279. Report of the Bank Committee.
2

1
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25
tions . Inasmuch as previous investments had
brought marked success, there was an abiding
faith in the development as well as the reliability of the United States. Nicholas Biddle and
his London agent Jaudon introduced the Florida
bonds to the European market. Jaudon gave Gamble a letter of introduction to Hope and Company of
Amsterdam in which the Union Bank bonds were
described as “solid and desirable a security as any
26
in the market“ . Contrary rumors were afloat,
however, for the Barings of London had already become sceptical and were urging caution. Due to this
factor, Gamble was unable to sell his bonds except
at a discount and, at that, seven hundred four re27
mained unsold .
Adverse reports of Florida were by no means the
sole reason why European bankers cast dubious
eyes across the Atlantic. The whole financial fabric
of the United States faced a collapse in the years
1835-38 which gave rise to the growing fear that,
should this occur, the States would have neither the
resources nor the
will to meet the heavy obligations
28
being incurred . Subsequent events were to justify
only too well this uneasiness. Thus the inability of
the Union Bank to market its securities abroad was
due rather to the general financial situation than to
the anti-bank activities of the Territorial Council
29
as the Bank directors charged later .

“Some Aspects of American State Debts
25 McGrane,
Reginald, C.,
in the Forties” in American Historical Review, July 1933,
p. 674.
2
6
p. 676.
27 Apalachicola Gazette,October 30,1839.Aneditorial speaks of
the growing distrust in northern centers of Florida banks.
This has been due to the irregular methods of the banks and
a fear that their bills will not be redeemed.
28 McGrane,“SomeAspects ofAmerican StateDebts intheForties,”
p. 678.
29 Ex Docs, H of R, no 111, p. 395. Reply of the Directors of the
Union Bank.
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If the initiation of the Bank had been stormy, the
course of its life increased rather than decreased its
struggles. The dubious attitude of a portion of the
citizens was never dispelled and the success of the
Bank was not such as to win over its opponents. In
fact, its opening saw the inauguration of a speculation which, from its description, was not unlike the
the boom years just passed. The sky seemed the
limit in both instances. With such a spirit rampant,
it was hardly possible to keep a sane and judicious
course. The usual misrepresentation of property
values appeared; negroes were shifted from plantation to plantation to swell the size of the slave
30
groups offered as security for stock purchases .
Loans were contracted on thoroughly unsound bases
as events proved. Lands were cleared and then de31
serted for lack of resources for their cultivation .
The citizens of middle Florida enjoyed a spree of
paper prosperity which caused hopes and visions to
soar but soon produced a severe economic headache,
The finish came rapidly, for by the latter part of
1839 the condition of the Union Bank, as well as the
other two corporations aided by Territorial credit,
was sufficiently precarious to start political agitation. The issue was to become paramount during
the next few years and resulted not only in the failure of the institutions but in the repudiation of the
bonds themselves by the very authority which had
created them.
As usual, mistakes of judgment and overoptimistic policies were branded as evidences of premeditated corruption; and many who would gladly
have reaped the profits-had there been profitsnow pointed the finger of dishonor and shouted that
30 History of Banking in Florida, p. 23.
31 Ellen Call, Florida Breezes, p. 209-10. This, part fiction,
part fact, memoir of territorial days describes. some of the
social conditions resulting from the financial confusion.
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“the people” had been betrayed. Friends ceased to
be friends; reputations cracked and fell, some deservedly and some unjustly. As the author of Florida Breezes commented, the Bank had put more
people in the graveyard than the doctors. No one
who has lived through the last seven years can fail
to appreciate the human fears, frailties, and disappointments involved. Territorial Florida was being
caught in the jam of the financial indiscretions and
poor judgment of her own leaders and the nation at
large.
The first serious attack upon the banking situation was made by the St. Joseph Convention which
had met to frame a prospective state constitution.
In 1839, this convention made a formal petition to
Congress “respectfully insisting” on the intervention of the national government to save the Territory from the disasters about to be inflicted by the
32
banks possessing territorial bonds . The memorial
presented by the Territorial delegate, David Yulee,
was ordered printed but Congress took no further
action. In the Territorial Council of that year, the
banks were sustained; efforts at investigation were
sidetracked and came to nothing while the governor
in his message endorsed them as being “in good
condition and worthy of high credit." Call continued his eulogy by enumerating the financial services rendered to the Territory and declaring the
banks to be “indispensible agents for the promotion of commerce and highly advantageous in the
33
ordinary transactions of life” .
The growing political opposition to the Union
Bank was not directed to that institution alone for
the other corporations carrying territorial bonds
32 Documents, 25th Congress, 2nd session, III, D 232. Resolution of the St. Joseph Convention, December 3, 1838.
33 Journal 1839. Message of Governor Call, January 9,
1839, p. 7.
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were in equally stringent circumstances. Indeed, the
Bank of Pensacola was the most insolvent of the
three as the railroad project for whose assistance it
34
had been created had entirely collapsed . The fact
was that the people of Florida were becoming panicky at the staggering load of indebtedness facing
them. Furthermore, the bank policies had produced,
or were credited with producing, an extravagance
and sham luxury among the propertied classes always especially irritating to humbler groups. As a
later committee of investigation expressed it, the
35
creditor walks while the debtor rides in a carriage .
Another grievance was the large payments of interest to northern and European bondholders. It
was frequently asserted that if the Union Bank
would default on its interest payments conditions
within Florida would improve. “The honor of the
bank is just as much involved in fulfilling its promise to the poor man who holds but one single dollar
of its money as to the foreign banker who holds one
million of its bonds. The poor man worked for his
dollar and expected the bank would act in good faith
and redeem it. He did not expect that he would have
to part with half of it to enrich the domestic or
36
foreign banker" .
As has been previously stated the issue of antibankism first raised its head in the St. Joseph Convention. A political group organized itself as the
37
Loco Focos in 1839 and spread rapidly . Its membership consisted primarily of Democrats; in fact, in
some localities, the name Democrat and loco foco
were used interchangeably, and eventually the latter was discarded entirely. Support of the banks
34Pensacola Gazette,July24,1841.
35 Journal 1844, p. 72.
36 Florida Sentinel, Tallahassee, May 28, 1841. Editorial “Voice
of the People.”
37 Florida Sentinel,Tallahassee, September 16, 1843.
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came from the Whigs although it was argued that
the State Rights Whigs were really anti-bank. Agitation against the bank group, or the “ragocracy”
as it was termed, was the key note of the election of
1839. For the three or four years previous, this
party had held an undivided sway over elections. By
1839, their interest was not only protection of the
banks but also opposition to the St. Joseph Consti38
tution for its proposed financial regulations . To
break this influence, the politicians and the press
sounded the alarm and39fought the campaign with
something akin to fury. When the smoke cleared .
away, it was discovered that the House of Representatives had gone to the loco focos or Democrats. But
the struggle was not over; during the three succeeding years, the same issues and intensity prevailed
to the exclusion of all other questions. The bank
cause was yoked in many combinations. The Democrats thundered against it as evidence of moneyed
monopolies and a betrayal of the rights of the people
40
in true Jacksonian style . The Whigs tried to divert the attention of the people from things financial
to the project of dividing the Territory into two
41
states . Possibly the most far-fetched story was
that circulated in Tallahassee to the effect that the
bank party was in league with the abolitionists. A
crowd gathered around the office of the Floridian
and before it was dispersed, an order went out to
42
Quincy for a detachment of militia . The end was
inevitable from the beginning, however, and by 1844
38

Apalachicola Gazette, September 4, 1839. Article entitled the
“Constitution.”
39 Pensacola Gazette, January 9, 1840, Letter from Tallahassee:
June 13, 1840, Letter signed James Catlin.
40 Journal 1840. Message of Governor Reid, January 13,
1840. Reid, the new territorial governor, was a loco foco.
41 Florida Herald, St. Augustine, July 10, 1840; August 28, 1840.
42 Quincy Sentinel,August 7,1840.
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the question was a “rotten carcass” as the St. Aug43
ustine News elegantly phrased it .
In spite of all this frenzy of local politics, actual
investigation of the banks was brought about by the
federal government. The increasing gravity of the
territorial situation finally arrested the attention of
the President and by him was carried before Con44
gress . The Senate thereupon, passed a resolution
requesting the President to gather detailed information on the whole subject with special reference. to
the Big Three of Florida. On January 3, 1840, this
resolution was sent by Secretary of State Forsyth
to Governor Reid and, twelve days later, presented
to the Legislative Council. The complexion of the
House, as has been stated, was loco foco but the
friends of the banks, of whom there were still a few,
moved unsuccessfully to table the resolution. The
majority then passed its own policy of referring the
45
matter to the Bank Committee (E. E. Blackburn,
chairman) for the investigation of the banks and to
the Committee on Judiciary (Walker Anderson,
chairman) for an opinion on the validity of the ter46
ritorial bonds . Meanwhile the Senate, still pro-bank
in character, reported through its committee on
Finance and Banking, that the collection of such information was an executive concern as the Secretary
of the Territory already had the data turned in by
47
the Banks . The Senate further assumed that the
present session would see a thorough bank investi4

3
Augustine September 14, 1844.
44 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Message
of December 2, 1839. III, p. 540.
45 Ex Docs, H of R, no 111, p. 250. Nine points were listed in the
resolution on which specific information was requested.
Their satisfaction constituted a searching inquiry into bank
management as well as the political events and technicalities
of the banks’ organization.
46 Blackburn and Anderson had made unsuccessful efforts
to subscribe to the stock of the Union Bank in 1838.
47 Journal 1840, p. 19.
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gation - even though it doubted that there was time
for any action-and on January 23, resolved for a
joint committee to undertake the task. This attitude of complaisant leisure was rudely shattered
when the House rejected the joint committee on the
ground that it had already proceeded with its own
48
investigation .
A month later the Senate was thrown into dismay
by the report of the Committee of the Judiciary already endorsed by the House. The bank supporters
rallied to the fort, as it were, and passed a resolution
that the opinions and doctrines contained therein
were “disorganizing in their character, subversive
to settled order of society, dangerous in their tendencies and calculated in the eyes of the civilized
world to destroy all confidence in the honor, in49
tegrity and good faith of the people of Florida .
A second resolution declared them absolved from
any reproach in the matter of bank investigation
inasmuch as the House had rejected the joint com50
mittee .
The two reports against the Union Bank made in
1840 were therefore the work of the House and, from
51
that very fact, highly partisan . The charges of the
Bank Committee may be reduced to three classifications: 1)violations of charter requirements, 2)mismanagement of banking activities, especially in the
matter of unsound loans, and 3)the creation of serious social conditions due to the extravagance and
speculation which it fostered. The first class of indictments has been treated in connection with the
bond issues; no more need be said here. Unsound
48 Ex Docs, H of R, no 111, p. 256.
49 Journal 1840, p. 126.
50 p. 128.
51 were also reports on the Bank of Pensacola and the
Southern Life Insurance and Trust Company, but these
banks together held only $900,000 in territorial bonds while
the Union Bank held $3,000,000.
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loans there undoubtedly were but some transactions
which proved unsound did not appear so when
52
made . If the high hopes and visions of the Territory had materialized, many of the unsound loans
would have been paid off. When credit began to fail,
efforts were made to bolster it up by more credit, a
procedure which usually results in catastrophe but
is just as usually tried, as events of the last seven
years have demonstrated. The Committee made
much of the ethical effect of the bank’s existence on
the community. It was a point which lent itself to
the always popular contrast of rich and poor even
though it was an exaggerated picture of the half
bankrupt, overdeveloped plantations of middle
Florida.
The second report, that on the validity of the
bonds, was the more significant of the two because,
should its position be adopted by the Territory none
of the three banks, sound or unsound, could survive.
The Committee on the Judiciary struck boldly at the
root of the question by denying the constitutionality
of the faith bond. The Territory, it maintained, had
never possessed the authority to issue such securities inasmuch as, during the territorial period, the
sovereignty of the people lies dormant. The power
of the Council extended only to needful rules and
regulations not to calling into existence institutions
which are protracted far beyond its own life and
53
yet obligate the sovereign people . Congress, in
the opinion of the Commitee, was the rightful authority to assume responsibility for the bonds
52

pioneer resident of St. Augustine reported one case in which
the planter had used a well developed and prosperous plantation as security for his loan with every prospect of making
the necessary payment. During the Indian wars, he was
wiped out completely.
53 Ex Docs, H of R, no 111, p. 259. Report of the Committee on
Judiciary.
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issued , but the Territory could not afford to allow
the matter to ride. Therefore, there followed the
recommendation for immediate passage of two resolutions to the effect that the bonds were null and
void, since they were not issued by a competent
55
authority .
The directors of the bank fought this report more
than any criticism of their management and well
they might, for it undermined their very existence.
Accusing the Council of seeking to ruin the bank,
they gave a strong defense of the legality of the
bonds and the power of the Council:
If the Territorial Legislature is . . . incapable of creating a corporation because . . . it has
no attribute of sovereignty then the conclusion
is inevitable that every charter hitherto granted
by the Council . . . whether for pious, literary
or commercial purposes is not merely voidable
but . . . absolutely null and void. Nay every
other legislative act of implied sovereignty, being equally destitute of constitutional authority
is alike null and void . . . Every execution of a
malefactor convicted of a capital offense under
a territorial law is murder; every imposition
of a tax for general or local purposes a fraud
or a trespass; and every restraint upon per56
sonal liberty an act of tyranny .
By the time the Council met in 1841, a new situation had arisen, the Union Bank had to pay $670,000
on July 1, 1841, or default. The directors petitioned
for permission to sell the remaining seven hundred
four bonds at a discount to meet this obligation while
stoutly asserting the inherent solvency of the bank
54Ibid,p.268.
p . 269.
56 Ibid, pp. 396-99. Reply of the Directors of the Union Bank.
5 5
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itself . Unsuccessful efforts in both House and
Senate were made to grant the request but no sentiment in active support of the bank could be mustered although the Council was obviously not ready
to take drastic action. Just before the close of the
session the direction of the political wind revealed
itself through a resolution introduced in the Senate
to submit the territorial bond issue to the people 58
at
the next election. This was rejected three to seven .
In the course of the following year the whole question was removed from the future to the immediate
present by two events: first, the bondholders of the
Bank of Pensacola applied to the Governor for the
defaulted interest payments, and, second, the Union
Bank passed its interest in July 1841. The first
situation was treated elaborately in the message of
the new governor, Richard Keith Call. Call believed
in the validity of the bonds but realized the impossibility of meeting the payments; his solution
was to refuse to admit the responsibility of the Territory until the bondholders had exhausted legal
59
steps to force payment from the stockholders . His
views did not meet the mind of the Council, however,
who saw itself confronted by the bogey of their bad
dreams, responsibility for a debt far beyond their
capacity to meet. Repudiation resolutions passed
60
both houses in spite of all opposition and were followed by an act prescribing the method of cancel61
ling the bonds . Indeed, the House was willing to
go still farther and provide for the closing up of
the Union Bank on the ground of insolvency. A bill
57 Journal 1841, Appendix. Memorial of the President and
Directors of the Union Bank.
58 Journal 1841, p. 123. The people were to write on the
ballots “faith bonds” or “no faith bonds.”
59 Journal 1842. Message of Governor Call, January 6,
1842, p. 15ff.
60 Ibid, p. 116 House Journal 1842, p. 174.
61 and Resolutions . . . Florida, 1842. p. 45.
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to this effect passed through its hands and after
some amendment was endorsed by the Senate. All
the anti-bank legislation were vetoed by the Governor, but the repudiation
measures were repassed
62
over his veto . The text of the repudiation resolution was as follows:
Resolved: That the Territorial Legislature
does not possess nor was it ever invested with
the authority to pledge the faith of the Territory so as to render citizens of the Territory
responsible for debts or engagements of any
corporations chartered by any said Territorial
63
Legislature .
The people of the Territory sustained this action
although the cause for the validity of repudiation
was never wholly won. Everyone admitted that the
bonds could not be paid; the Territory had not the
resources to make good the obligations nor was
there any temper on the part of the people to tax
themselves excessively to reimburse foreign bondholders. On the other hand, many rejected the notion
that the bonds had never been valid and were not
unaware of the blot which repudiation placed on the
credit of Florida, no matter what view of the legalities one might take. One of the excellent discussions
of this point of view appeared in the Pensacola
Gazette, September 19, 1840, doubtless written by
Benjamin D. Wright:
There are some in Florida who affect to think
the Territory is not responsible for these bonds
because we lack many of the attributes of state
sovereignty . . . Some again pretend. to believe
that the general government is responsible and
not the Territory . . .
62 Journal 1842, p. 168. House Journal 1842, p. 294.
63 and Resolutions . . . Florida, 1842, p. 53.
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These are all kindred views, are mere pretexts, too poor to merit serious refutation. Ours
is as truly and thoroughly a government of the
people, as far as the law making power is concerned, as is any state government in the Union.
It is true that Congress has reserved the power
to annul our laws but no one ever imagined that
the mere reservation of this power of annulment operated to impair the validity of laws not
anulled.
Let us not add disingenuousness to injustice
and fraud to folly. We owe these bonds and
cannot pay them. Our population is small, our
treasury is empty, half of our territory is in
possession of a savage foe and the people of the
other half are compelled to stand with arms in
their hands for the protection of their homes.
. . . Yet these facts, well known as they are to
us at home, are not known and can never be
fully understood and appreciated by the bondholders abroad. The naked unmitigated fact
that a large portion of the public securities of
this country have been dishonored will alone
be felt and understood. . . . Under such circumstances what is to be done? This question addresses itself not only to the people of Florida
but to the people of every part of the United
States. It is in vain to attempt to discriminate
between State stocks and Territorial stocks;
they all stand on the same foundation, the faith
of the people. Florida has involved herself beyond the possibility of extrication; but it is not
64
on her alone that the evil will fall . . . .
The Union Bank thus deprived of its capital, proceeded to the dreary task of attempting to straighten
out its affairs. Its greatest difficulty was that of
6 4

Gazette, September 19, 1 8 4 0 .
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realizing on its stock from the supposedly “rich,”
planters unable to meet their loans. Most of the
stockholders were apparently willing to meet the
demands whenever possible but some of their
brethern felt otherwise, for as one newspaper sagely
if cynically remarked “people will pay the most important bills.” Numerous methods were devised of
effecting this escape. One was to run off the moveable property used as collateral; this was easy when
65
said property was on either two feet or four . Another dodge was to oppose the efforts of the bank
66
to collect on its stock by filing usury charge . The
bank again petitioned the Council for a modification
of its charter, this time to permit it to settle its stock
purchases by accepting territorial bonds on a per67
centage basis . The petition was refused and
branded as so outrageous that it would at once for68
feit the charter if attempted .
It must be admitted that the Council failed to display a very enlightened attitude at this stage of affairs. Once the bonds had been declared null and
void and the territorial responsibility thus eliminated, it is hard to see why Florida as well as the
bank would not have profited by salvaging as much
as possible from the ruins. Not only was the government of no assistance to the bank but it put the
final period to its activities (1843), by suspending
its banking powers until it resumed specie pay69
ments . Nothing more was said about the bonds
although several efforts were made to pass rein6 5

New Orleans, F e b r u a r y 23, 1842. An from
the Apalachicola Journal told of one schooner chartered to
transfer slaves from St. Joseph to Texas to avoid being
attached for the debt of their owner to the Union Bank.
Similar attempts were made later but were not so successful.
66 Journal, 1844, Appendix. Report of the Union Bank,
January 2, 1844.
67 Journal 1843, pp. 109-10.
68 and Resolutions, Florida, 1843, p. 74. Resolution XXII.
69 and Resolutions . . . Florida, 1843, pp. 59-62.
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forcing resolutions, thus indicating some remaining
70
uneasiness regarding earlier action .
This act of 1843 virtually closed the Union Bank
as such by placing a condition on its operation which
everyone knew could not be met. It is not the scope
of this discussion to enter into the legal details of
settlement which dragged on for years. Something
further should be said, however, on the fate of the
bonds. Efforts on the part of the bondholders to
secure redress from the Legislative Council was an
annual event until Florida became a state, when attention was transferred to the new Legislature.
There was some discussion in both houses but the
position was maintained that no action was in order
inasmuch as the bonds had already been declared
71
null and void . The state situation was especially
discouraging since the new constitution forbade taxation except for the necessary expenditures of the
72
state .
The bondholders now sought the aid of Congress
whom they held responsible on two counts: l)because it had permitted the issue of the bonds, and
2)because Florida had been admitted to the Union
under a constitution which closed all avenues of re73
dress . Memorials were presented and found their
way to committees of both House and Senate where
they remained until 1847. In February 1847, the
Judiciary Committee of the Senate advised referring the matter to the Attorney General and the
74
Secretary of the Treasury for further information .
Under the direction of Henry D. Gilpin, a Philadelphia lawyer, a new statement of claims was drawn
up and laid before the Attorney General in August
70 of the House and Senate, 1843.
71 of Bonds and Guarantees, pp. 25-6.
p . 36.
73 Ibid,pp. 35-40.
74 p. 10.
7 2

Published by STARS, 1936

23

Florida Historical Quarterly, Vol. 15 [1936], No. 4, Art. 3

230

1847. As far as can be discovered, nothing was
done.
Balked in every effort to gain compensation on
this side of the Atlantic, the British holders of Florida bonds acted through their own government after
the Convention of February 8, 1853 between the
United States and Great Britain. The faith bonds
now took the stage as one of the claims of British
subjects against the United States and as such became the subject of international arbitration. In
presenting her case before the Umpire, the United
States denied any responsibility for the bonds. The
territorial government, she claimed, was not an
agency of the United States. The United States had
no authority to borrow money on the credit of a
territory nor was it liable for its debts. The power
to disapprove the bills of a legislative council did
not render the federal government liable for the acts
done under them; furthermore the laws once enacted
and not disproved “have precisely the same binding
force and efficiency within its limits as those of a
state.” The decision of the Umpire was favorable
to the United States on the basis that the United
States was not liable for the acts of Florida because
she was a territory and that none of the bondholders
expected her to be when they bought the bonds. The
only recourse open to them, therefore, was to peti75
tion the Governor and Legislature of Florida .
Whether the United States was wholly justified in
her denial of liability, she at least maintained her
point consistently and successfully, even in an international arbitration.
But the ghost of the bonds still hovered over Florida. Of the $3,900,000 issued, $3,504,000 remained
unaccounted for and produced echoes, so to speak,
75 John Bassett, International Arbitrations, Florida Bond
Cases, pp. 3594-3606.
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as the years passed. In 1868, the carpet bag convention ordered an inquiry into the liability of the
State, probably sensing some untapped field of
profit. A committee was appointed consisting of
one old resident and two carpet baggers but their
investigation was hampered by the fact that Charles
G. English, solicitor for the bank interests prior to
the war, burned his papers and left Tallahassee.
The chairman generously declared that neither the
Territory nor the United States was liable for the
bonds but suggested that one acre of Florida land
76
be given for each dollar of bonds . No attention was
paid to the report beyond awarding $500 to the
chairman for his services.
Territorial bonds to the amount of $143,000 fell
into the hands of George Peabody and were left by
him for the benefit of education in the South. For a
time Florida received no benefit from this fund but
eventually she was able to convince the trustees
that
78
the state had never repudiated the bonds . Even in
recent times, the State Treasurer is sometimes questioned by some person who has come into possession
of one of the old bonds and has hopes of their value.
76
History of Banking in Florida, p. 53.
78
Ibid, p. 61.
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